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Work product is the legal doctrine that central casting would send
over. First, it boasts profundities, arising as it does from the colliding
thrusts of our discovery and trial processes and from conflicting currents
in our modified adversary system. Second, it will surface frequently,
because the protected materials are commonly created by each side but
uncommonly useful to the opponent. Third, it has generated a small
mountain of lower-court case law, with the foothills forming a labyrinth
of rules and wrinkles. In short, work product has for a couple of genera-
tions dramatically bewitched academics, bothered practitioners, and be-
wildered students.
As proof of its fascination, I offer-without need of citation-the
glacial expanse of commentary on work-product immunity from civil
discovery. As proof of its difficulty, I note-without insult by citation-
the serious shortcomings of almost all of that commentary. Work prod-
uct is one of those subjects that require the initiate to spend inordinate
time stumbling through the moraine of cases and up to a sufficient
height to view the whole unified doctrine. Yet this subject is so remark-
ably important in theory and practice that countless souls have volun-
teered for the mission. Significant intellectual challenge and truly
compelling importance compose the formula for disorder. So many
commentators (and judges) wander into the moraine, focus hard but
myopically on some tiny facet of the work-product doctrine, and leave a
deposit of fresh confusion.
One of the contributing causes of this disorder is the questionable
legal process that produced the work-product doctrine. In the forties,
the Supreme Court passed up the rulemaking route for the pointillist
case method, kicking off the process of clarification with the great case of
Hickman v. Taylor. In 1970, from the welter of conflicting decisions the
rulemakers attempted to codify workable sensibleness, adopting the
poorly executed rule 26(b)(3). 2 Today we thus enjoy intensified confu-
* Copyright © 1983 by Kevin M. Clermont.
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. A.B. 1967, Princeton University; J.D. 1971,
Harvard University.
1 329 U.S. 495 (1947). For background, including the Advisory Committee's proposed
rule that the Supreme Court rejected in 1946, see R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT,
MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 445-47 (4th ed. 1978).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). For criticism of that rule, see Friedenthal, The Rulemaking
Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporay Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673, 677-82 (1975).
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sion. Nevertheless, several years of trying to teach work product have
left me believing that the path to higher understanding departs from a
chronologic study of that legal process.
Hickman soundly divided the subject into "ordinary" and "opinion"
work product. An example of ordinary work product is the signed wit-
ness statement prepared in anticipation of litigation. It generally re-
ceives a qualified immunity, which the discovering party can overcome
by a sufficient showing of need. An example of opinion work product is
the unrecorded mental impression of the attorney concerning the litiga-
tion. It merits virtually absolute immunity.
Work product after Hickman, with protected materials divided into
opinion and ordinary work product
Rule 26(b)(3) surprisingly, irrelevantly, and apparently inadver-
tently 3 divided the same world into "tangible" and "intangible" work
product. The rule implicitly recognized that both ordinary and opinion
work product, deserving different degrees of protection, could appear in
documents and tangible things. The rule left intangible work product
on its own.
So what should happen when a party seeks by interrogatory only
the substance of a witness statement, as opposed to seeking a copy of the
statement itself? 4 On the one hand, if rule 26(b)(3) is approached as an
3 See Comment, Ambiguities After the 1970 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Relating to Discovery of Experts and Attorney's Work Product, 17 WAYNE L. REv. 1145, 1163 n. 108
(1971).
4 This question causes considerable confusion in the trenches. See Shapiro, Some
Problems of Discovery in an Adversag System, 63 MINN. L. REv. 1055, 1058-73 (1979).
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"accurate codification" of the work-product doctrine,5 we run into a siz-
able conceptual barrier. On the other hand, if rule 26(b)(3) is seen as
having "no application" to intangible work product,6 we have a handle
on solving the problem. The critical insight, then, is partial codification.
By this I mean that the rule neither spans the whole subject of work
product nor supplants all of the prior case law. As a codification, the
rule provides some answers, but only for questions arising from part of
the doctrine. When a question arises outside the scope of the rule, an
approach that looks to the rule for an answer is at best misleading.
? ': ..........
Opinion/Ordinar
Work product after first-level effect of rule 26(b)(3), which is
represented by shaded area
The insight of partial codification is but the first step. Then come
fixing the realm of the rule's coverage and concluding that within that
realm the rule preempts Hickman. At a first-level glance, the rule treats
only tangible work product. Within that realm, the rule's protection
might expand Hickman (perhaps, for example, regarding the range of
persons whose efforts can constitute work product) or might contract
Hickman (perhaps, for example, regarding the strictness of the anticipa-
tion-of-litigation requirement). Let me explain this role of rule 26(b)(3)
more fully. For certain questions involving tangible work product, au-
thoritative answers derive from the rule and not from Hickman. Obvi-
ously, a knowledge of Hickman's policies and principles will inform a
reading of the rule. Nevertheless, interpreting a rule presents a task ju-
risprudentially distinct from elaborating a case-law doctrine.
5 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2023, at 193
(1970).




Outside the rule, Hickman survives to govern. The initial challenge
of resort to that case's policies and principles confronts the deci-
sionmaker.7 Next come the challenge of recognizing that those aspects
of Hickman that the rule fails to cover apply even to tangible work prod-
uct (like assertion at trial or loss by waiver) and the challenge of mesh-
ing Hickman with contiguous doctrines (like the attorney-client privilege
or the newly recognized auditor's work-product immunity8 ). Let me ex-
plain this role of Hickman more fully too. First, for a question outside
the scope of the rule-such as when a party seeks by interrogatory only
the substance of a witness statement-it is Hickman that is still authorita-
tive. Of course, the rule will exert some influence as an existing, parallel
reading of Hickman. Nevertheless, elaborating work product on a sensi-
tive case-by-case basis yields a doctrine without the "squared-off cor-
ners" of rulemaking. Second, Hickman does not fall within neat
boundaries. For instance, it spills over to tangible work product and
thus expands or contracts the first-impression thrust of rule 26(b) (3),
with the protection extending to trial but disappearing by waiver.9
Intangible/Tangible
H m Line
Work product today, suggesting Hickman's continuing impact on
tangible work product
7 The most recent available publication on work product nicely extracts and analyzes
the policies of Hickman. Ndte, The Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83 COLUM. L.
RE%-. 412, 424-32 (1983).
8 Set United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 219-21 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 1180 (1983) (No. 82-687).
9 Perhaps a wholly different example would help here. A serious question concerns the
bounds of work-product protection in subsequent litigation. See Grolier Inc. v. FTC, 671 F.2d
553, 554-56 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2209 (1983). A recent Note, supra note 7, ap-
proaches this question by explaining that rule 26(b)(3) codifies the doctrine, id at 419-20, and
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This is not a pretty picture, nor a self-explanatory one. The pre-
vailing scheme induces totally misguided decisions. Even optimal deci-
sions can yield only an imperfect doctrine because of discontinuities
between tangible and intangible work product. Uncertainties unavoid-
ably abound, calling unheededly for reform.
Indeed, the obscure ugliness of this scheme repels commentators,
who therefore rush to address their direct concern: the bounds of work-
product protection. That is, which kinds of items are protected, and
how protected are they? And what are the temporal dimensions of the
doctrine? And who can create work product, assert the protection, or
waive it?
My thesis, in summary, is that without divining at the threshold the
scheme here suggested, commentators inevitably misdraw the map of
the doctrine. But taking that threshold step allows one to make sense of
all of those difficult questions and to provide sound answers for most.
The student authors of the following Special Project have climbed
to take in the vista before addressing those specific questions. I com-
mend their effort to you.
then confusingly jumping back to Hickman, id at 424 & n.92. A better approach would ex-
pressly establish that the rule does not cover this matter and that therefore Hickman's policies
and principles provide the answer for intangible and tangible work product alike.
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